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Abstract
This paper is the second and final part of the overview of “Major Events and
Policy Issues in EC Competition law in 2004”, following from last month’s jour-
nal. This part of the paper is divided into three sections: (1) Recent Commission
decisions on cartels, co-operation, distribution and abuse of dominant position,
including notably the Microsoft decision; (2) an outline of current policy issues,
including possible extension of in-house privilege and possible Art.82 EC guide-
lines; (3) a survey of some areas of particular interest.Notably, the Commission’s
recent drive topromote cempetition in the liberal professions with a decision in-
volving Belgian Architects; recent energy cases; and the Commission’s decision
on the sale of UEFA’s football media rights.
This paper is the second and final part of the
overview of ‘‘Major Events and Policy Issues in EC
Competition law in 2004’’, following from last
month’s journal.1 This part of the paper is divided
into three sections:
(1) Recent Commission decisions on cartels,
co-operation,distributionandabuseofdom-
inant position, including notably theMicro-
soft decision;
(2) anoutlineof currentpolicy issues, including
possible extension of in-house privilege and
possible Art.82 EC guidelines;
(3) a survey of some areas of particular interest.
Notably, theCommission’srecentdrivetopro-
mote competition in the liberal professions
with a decision involving Belgian Architects;
recent energy cases; and the Commission’s
decision on the sale of UEFA’s football
media rights.
Commission Decisions
Cartels (see Table 1)
There has not been quite the same level of fining
decisions this year as last. Two ‘‘old’’ decisions
which have been published this year merit some
comment: Austrian Banks and Methylglucamine.
Otherwise, there have been eight decisions an-
nounced, ranging in sector from copper tubes sup-
ply to architects’ services and tobacco purchasing.
It isproposed tooutline thenewcases first and then
point out some aspects of the ‘‘old’’ decisions. The
Belgian architects case is discussed in the section
on areas of particular interest below, together with
theCommission’s recentactiononcompetitionand
the liberal professions.
Itmay be useful to note at the outset there is now
no ‘‘cartel unit’’ as such. Rather, enforcement of
Art.81 EC, including cartels, has been reorganised
on an industry basis within DG COMP (as was the
case some years ago).
The Commission also now publishes (i) press
releases; (ii) short case summaries (in the ECOfficial
Journal); and (iii) full decisions in the language of the
case and the official Commission languages on its
website. This appears to be a result of the new En-
largement,bringingyetmore languages into theEU.
Thoseconcernedwithworldwidecartels should
also be aware that the US rules have changed to
allow an amnesty applicant to limit its exposure to
single instead of treble damages under certain con-
ditions.2
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Table 1
Total Fines Highest fines(s)
Carbon and graphite products: e101 Carbone Lorraine was fined e43.05
Organic peroxides: e70 Atofina was fined e43.47
Industrial tubes: e79 KME Group companies fined a total of e39.81
Belgian architects: e0.1
Copper plumbing tubes: e222.3 KME Group companies fined a total of e67.08
French beer: e2.5 Danone e1.5
Spanish raw tobacco: e20 Deltafina e11.88
Needles and haberdashery: e60 Coats and Prym e30 each
e554.9 (All figures are emillion)
N.B. — Credit for evidentiary contribution outside leniency (2002 Notice principle applied in 1996 Notice cases
also).
— Issue of responses to requests for information inAustrian Banks decision also.
— ‘‘Treuhand’’ consultant firm fined inOrganic Peroxides.
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Carbon and graphite products
In December 2003, the Commission imposed fines
of some e101million on five companies for operat-
ing a cartel in the market for electrical and mech-
anical carbon and graphite products. Electrical
carbon and graphite products are used mainly to
transfer electricity to and in electrical motors.3
Mechanical carbon and graphite products are used
to seal gases and liquids in vessels and to keep low-
wear parts in machines lubricated.
The EEA-wide market for such products was
found to be worth some e291 million in 1998, the
last year of the infringement (interestingly, here the
Commission identified themarket as including the
value of captiveuse). The infringementwas treated
as ‘‘very serious’’.
The cartel operated between October 1988 and
December 1999. During this period the companies,
which were found to control 93 per cent of the
European market, held more than 140 meetings to
decideprice increases forabroadrangeofproducts,
as well as for large individual customers.
Although during the same period some of the
companies were participating in two other cartels,
graphite electrodes and speciality graphite, which
have also been found and punished, the fines im-
posed were not increased for this, because the
collusive behaviour was broadly contemporaneous.
The Commission reduced the fine that would
otherwise have been imposed on SGL by 33 per
cent, because it had already imposed high fines on
SGL in the previous two cartels and because the
undertaking was in a difficult financial situation
(although the Commission did not otherwise ac-
cept SGL’s submission on inability to pay).
The fines, after reductions for co-operation in
most cases, ranged from e43million on Le Carbone
Lorraine to e1million on ConradtyNu¨rnberg, with
Morgan Crucible receiving full immunity for hav-
ing been the first company to report the cartel to the
Commission.
Organic peroxides
In December 2003, the Commission imposed fines
of nearly e70million on five companies for operat-
ing a cartel in the market for organic peroxides,
chemicals used in theplastic and rubber industries.4
The Commission found that the cartel operated
between 1971 and the end of 1999. With a total
durationof29years, thismade it the longest-lasting
cartel with which the Commission has dealt so far.
The cartel involved price-fixing and market-sharing
in an EEAmarket worth some e250 million a year.
The Commission found this to be a ‘‘very serious’’
infringement.The fines ranged frome43.47million
on Atofina to e1,000 on AC Treuhand, a Swiss
consultancy company involved in the cartel ad-
ministration.
The fines for Atofina, Laporte (now Degussa UK
Holdings) and Peroxid Chemie were increased sig-
nificantly for recidivism. Akzo was given full im-
munity(under the1996LeniencyNotice)becauseit
was the first to approach the Commission in early
2000 with decisive information on the cartel.
The decision to fineACTreuhand is interesting,
because normally such third-party service pro-
vidershavenotbeenpenalised.Here,ACTreuhand
is reported to have organised meetings, produced
market share papers and reimbursed the travel
expenses of participants to avoid leaving traces of
illegal meetings, suggesting that its involvement
went unusually far.
Industrial tubes
In December 2003, the Commission imposed fines
totalling some e79 million on three companies for
operating a cartel in relation to the supply of indus-
trial copper tubes for air-conditioning and refriger-
ation.5 The cartel was found to have involved
allocationofmarkets and the setting of price targets
and increases and other commercial terms in the
framework of the CuproclimaQuality Association.
The cartel was operated between May 1988 and
March 2001 in a market that the Commission esti-
mated to be worth e290 million in 2000 (although
the companies argue that much of that was just the
cost of metal, which was not part of their unlawful
co-operation, since its pricewas established on the
LondonMetal Exchange).
The fines, after reductions for co-operation,
ranged from e39.8 million on the companies now
in the KME group to e18 million on Outokumpu.
Outokumpu’s fine was increased for recidivism,
relying controversially on adecisionunder theECSC
Treaty related to stainless steel cold-rolled prod-
ucts. This is the subject of an appeal (as is themetal
turnover aspect of the decision).
Mueller Industries was given full immunity for
having approached and co-operatedwith the Com-
mission first.
Interestingly in the case, which came under the
1996 Leniency Notice, the Commission also ap-
plied the principle in the later 2002 Leniency
Notice, whereby a company’s fine may be reduced
for a specific evidentiary contribution. Here, in
addition to 50 per cent for leniency co-operation,
Outokumpu’s finewas reduced some further20per
cent for evidence disclosing the full duration of the
infringement.
Copper plumbing tubes
In September 2004, the Commission imposed fines
totalling somee222.3millionon someeight groups
[2005] I.C.C.L.R., ISSUE 3 c SWEET &MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]
110 RATLIFF: MAJOR EVENTSAND POLICY ISSUES IN EC COMPETITION LAW, 2003–2004 (PART 2): [2005] I.C.C.L.R.
3. IP/03/1651, December 3, 2003; O.J. L125/45, April 28,
2004 (summary).
4. IP/03/1700, December 10, 2003. 5. IP/03/1746, December 16, 2003.
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art49
of companies for operating a cartel in the European
market for copper water, heating and gas tubes.6
The cartel was found to have operated between
June 1988 and March 2001, in a market which the
Commission estimated to be worth some e1.15
billion in 2000. This was a similar infringement to
that involving industrial tubes andwascontempor-
aneouswith it, this time revolving around a quality
mark called SANCO.
Fines, after leniency, ranged frome67millionon
the companies now in theKME group toe9million
on Halcor. Again Mueller Industries was granted
full immunity for having approached the Commis-
sion first. Outokumpu’s fine was again increased
for recidivism, based on the earlier ECSC infringe-
ment.
French beer
In September 2004, the Commission also imposed
small fines totalling e2.5 million on the two main
brewery groups in France: Danone/Brasseries
Kronenbourg S.A. and Heineken N.V., for having
agreed to ‘‘balance’’ the ‘‘Horeca’’ markets between
the two groups.7
It appears that a so-called ‘‘armistice’’ agreement
was entered into by the parties in 1996, after an
‘‘acquisition war’’ during which each group had
been buying up drinks wholesalers, leading to an
inflation in the acquisition costs of such whole-
salers.
The companies are reported to have agreed to
bring an end to such rising costs and to ‘‘balance’’
their integrated distribution networks. This meant
that they agreed (a) to a temporary acquisition stop;
(b) to the ‘‘balancing’’ of the total volume of beer
distributed through the integrated network of each
party; and (c) to the ‘‘balancing’’ of the volume of
beer brands distributed by each party on behalf of
the other.
In setting the low fine, the Commission con-
sidered the infringement ‘‘serious’’ but took into
account that the agreement was never imple-
mented. However, the fine on Danone/Brasseries
Kronenbourg was increased for recidivism (after
the Belgian beer case).
Spanish raw tobacco
In October 2004, the Commission imposed fines
totalling e20 million on five companies involved
in raw tobacco processing in Spain, together with
smaller fines of e1,000 on several tobacco growers’
associations.8
The processing companies were found to have
colluded on prices paid to and the quantities
bought from tobacco growers in Spain. In other
words, this involved a purchasing cartel, rather
than a sales cartel. However, the tobacco growers
were found to have engaged in collective price
negotiationsontheir sidealso.Theyagreedonprice
ranges andminimumprices for negotiation of ‘‘cul-
tivation contracts’’ with processors.
The infringements took place between 1996 and
2001 and were considered to be ‘‘very serious’’
breaches in a market of relatively limited size (e25
million per year). Deltafina, a company active also
in Italy, was fined e11.8 million. The practices
appear to have been influenced by the agricultural
regulatorycontext, althoughtheCommissionstates
that the conduct ‘‘cannot be imputed’’ to the Com-
mon Market Organisation for Raw Tobacco. It is a
little surprising to see a statement in the press
release that this was ‘‘very serious’’, given the
limited national scope and size of market.
Needles and haberdashery
In October 2004, the Commission announced that
it had fined two companies, Coats Holdings and
William Prym, e30 million each for operating a
cartel in the needle market and for segmenting the
European market for haberdashery products (nee-
dles, pins, buttons, fasteners and zips) between
September 1994 and the end of 1999.9 A third
company, Entaco Group Ltd, received full immun-
ity for disclosing the cartel to the Commission. The
Commission states that Coats, one of the main
distributors of such products in Europe, forced
Entaco to enter into market-sharing with Prym at
manufacturing level in exchange for protection of
its own private label brand ‘‘Milward’’. This was
found to be a ‘‘very serious’’ infringement, in a
European market worth e1 billion in 2003. How-
ever, the cartel is said to have had limited impact.
Methylglucamine
The Commission published its decision in relation
to methylglucamine in February 2004.10 It may be
recalled that the case related to a price-fixing and
customer allocation agreement between Rhoˆne-
Poulenc Biochimie RPB (part of Aventis Pharma)
and Merck, found to have operated between 1990
and 1999.
Methylglucamine is a product which is mixed
with others to create a ‘‘contrast’’ agent used in
x-rays inmedical applications.Themarket inques-
tion is quite small, some e3.1 million per year (at
least this was so in 1999).
The Commission granted Merck a 100 per cent
reduction forcoming forwardfirstandco-operating
under the1996LeniencyNotice.RPB/Aventiswere
fined e2.85million after a 40 per cent reduction for
co-operation.
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On the decision, it appears that the Commission
relied much on Merck’s explanations and admis-
sions from both companies. The Commission sug-
gests that there were a series of price increases by
the twocompanies, generallyafterannualmeetings
to review the last year’s performance. There was
some debate about when the cartel ended and
therefore who had been responsible for the termin-
ation. Ultimately, the Commission could not de-
cide the issue and therefore took the last day for
validity of clearly agreed prices as the end. Again,
the Commission noted that proving the extent to
which prices differed as a result of a cartel is
extremelydifficult, given thevarious factorswhich
may apply.11
On fines, while finding the infringement ‘‘very
serious’’, theCommissionreducedthebasicamounts
considerably (to e2.5 million for each company)
because of the limited size of the product market.
The Commission increased the fine by 100 per cent
on Merck on the basis of deterrence (academically
because of the immunity granted), taking the view
that the addressees on theAventis sidewere in fact
smaller thanMerck (even though theAventis group
itselfwasmuchbigger). There appears tohave been
no increase for recidivism, even though Rhoˆne-
Poulenc had infringed before. There was a 90 per
cent increase for duration.
Aventis also sought mitigation of its fine for
having adopted a compliance programme. Unlike
theposition someyearsago, thiswas rejectedby the
Commission. These days the credit given appears
only to be for results leading to termination and/or
leniency applications!12
Austrian banks
The Commission published its decision in the
‘‘Lombard Club’’ banking case in February 2004.13
It may be recalled that this was a decision relating
to an extensive, widely-known structure of com-
mittees which had operated in Austria for many
years.14 The Commission fined eight banks some
e124 million in June 2002. Various aspects of the
decision are interesting.
First, originally the co-ordination arrangements
concernedhadbeenendorsed in law, apparently in
partbecause therewasconcern that therewerepoor
levels of profitability amongst the many banks in
Austria. There is also debate as to the extent to
which the authorities continued to be involved
informally, with the Commission noting that cer-
tain committees ‘‘quite central to this networkwere
not as a rule attended by the Austrian National
Bank’’ (emphasis added).15
Secondly, the arrangements concerned agree-
ments on various issues, notably interest rates for
lending anddeposits, and advertisingmeasures. In
particular, the Commission found that on occasion
the banks would react in concert to a reduction in
the National Bank’s key lending rates by lowering
deposit rates, without at the same time lowering
lending rates.
Thirdly, the Commission found that there was a
structure of committees dealing with different is-
sues, with systems for higher level discussion and
ultimately a group at the top called the ‘‘Lombard
Club’’. The Commission also found that certain
banks represented not only themselves in such
committees, but also certain sectoral groupings
(e.g. savings banks).
Fourthly, the Commission discussed in its deci-
sion a period from 1994 to 1998. However, Austria
only joined the EU from 1995. Since the Commis-
sion’s right to intervene was not clear for 1994
(it was argued that only the EFTA Surveillance
Authority was competent) as regards activities in
the EEA, the Commission did not find an infringe-
ment for that year.16
Fifthly, there is extensive treatment of the issue
of effect on trade: the banks arguing, on Bagnasco
and the Dutch Banks cases, that the effects were
limited to Austria; the Commission arguing that
suchacomprehensivearrangementclearlyaffected
trade.17 In addition, the Commission also set out
specific examples of theways inwhich it considers
trade was affected, some appearing more directly
relevant than others. Thus, the Commission re-
ferred to cross-border payment transactions and
foreign banks seeking to enter theAustrianmarket.
However, theCommissionalsosuggested that there
was indirect impact on investment and production
decisions of subsidiaries of foreign firms and Aus-
trian firms in Austria, and that the ability of indi-
viduals to purchase imported consumer durables
such as cars fromother countriesmight be affected.
Sixthly, the Commission’s approach to fining is
unusual. TheCommission selected anumber of the
larger banks, found to have played a more import-
ant role and, as noted, in some cases to have repre-
sented certain banking sectors. Fines were only
imposed on these selected banks and appear to
have been increased on those with such ‘‘represen-
tative’’ roles.18 The infringementwas also treated as
‘‘very serious’’ because of its ‘‘comprehensive and
institutionalised’’natureandtherelevanceofbank-
ing services to the whole economy.19
Seventhly, there is extensive discussion about
the duty of companies to reply to requests for
information and the related issue as to whether, if
they give more than they have to, they should
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receive ‘‘co-operation credit’’ for so doing. As in
Graphite Electrodes, the Commission considered
that the banks were required to give the material
facts of their involvement inmeetings, and existing
documents. (The Commission stated that here
it relied entirely on pre-existing documents.) The
banks argued that, insofar as this involves direct
admissions, they do not have to answer such re-
quests and, if theydo, it is a voluntary act deserving
a reduction in fine.20 TheCommission also rejected
claims that a ‘‘joint exposition of the facts’’ had
clarified the case, arguing that it was more of a
defence document. In the end, the Commission
only reduced the fines by 10 per cent, because the
banks did not contest the facts set out in the State-
ment of Objections.
Co-operation
Horizontal co-operation
There have been few full Commission decisions
this year on horizontal co-operation. However, the
Commission has published its decisions on the
German Network Sharing Agreement between O2
andT-Mobile21 and theReims IIpostal co-operation
case.22 These have been outlined before.23
National recycling schemes
The Commission has also published its decision
clearing the Austrian ‘‘ARA’’ system for collection
and recovery of packaging waste.24 This system is
operated by ARA (‘‘Altstoff Recycling Austria’’)
with various other companies. It may be recalled
that in 2002, the Commission had published a
rather complex Art.19(3) Notice indicating that it
planned to grant negative clearance or exemption
‘‘possiblywith conditions’’ to theAustrian system.25
Companies active in transport and sales pack-
aging, which are obliged by Austrian law to take
back any packaging they put into circulation and
provide for a suitable disposal, can adhere to ARA,
which is the main system for collection and recov-
ery of packagingwaste inAustria. They have to pay
a ‘‘licence fee’’ and thereby also acquire the right to
fix the ‘‘Green Dot’’ mark to their packaging. ARA
has entered into ‘‘waste disposal contracts’’ with
eight sectoral undertakings (called ‘‘branch’’ recyc-
ling companies, ‘‘BRGs’’) covering all sorts of pack-
agingmaterial for theentireAustrian territory.Each
of theseBRGsorganises thecollectionand/or recyc-
ling of a specific type of packaging material (e.g.
metal packaging, wood and ceramics, plastic and
textile fibres, paper and cardboard, and glass). The
BRGs do not carry out all of these tasks themselves,
but contractwith sectoral recycling companies and
regional collection and sorting partners.
Various undertakings were given to ensure that
the ‘‘GreenDot’’ systemdoesnotprevent freemove-
ment of goods26 (as in other cases). Otherwise, in its
2002 Notice, the Commission had appeared con-
cerned to promote competition at the regional
collection level, by giving collectors, which are
currently outside the ARA system, sufficient op-
portunity to compete for ARA business (under the
ARA system there is just one regional partner per
collection region).
Subsequently, in its 2003 decision, the Commis-
sion found that the exclusivity clauses binding
BRGs to one collector (but not also the collectors
to BRGs) per region for a five-year period infringed
Art.81(1) EC, because they hindered market entry
by other domestic and foreign collectors, which
were not participating in the ARA system.
TheCommissiongrantedanArt.81(3)ECexemp-
tion, after finding that the existing network effects
created by engaging only one collector per region
lead to efficiency gains through economies of scale
and scope.27 Furthermore, it estimated that the
relevant cost savings would be passed on to con-
sumers on the market for the packaged products.
It considered that three-year exclusivity could be
accepted to allow the recycling companies to re-
cover the substantial investments necessary to
build up the collection infrastructure, while it
was guaranteed that, after five years at the latest,
new contracts would be awarded via tendering
in a competitive, transparent and objective pro-
cedure.28
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Table 2
— Co-operation
* AustrianARA/ARGEV
 Local collector exclusivity allowed, if
public tendering.
* Air France Alitalia
 Competitors required on key routes!
* ‘‘SOs’’ for Cartes Bancaires and VISA.
 NB. GCB notification had ‘‘lapsed’’.
— Distribution
* Small fine on Topps for blocking parallel
trade in Poke´mon stickers.
* Proposed commitment decision for Repsol
service station settlement.
 Considerable market opening proposed.
 N.B. Cumulative network effect and high
market share.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Interestingly, therefore, the Commission is ac-
cepting competition by tender for disposal area
contracts at the latest every five years as sufficient
residual competition for the fourth requirement of
Art.81(3) EC,29 acknowledging that it would be al-
most impossible in practice and in economic terms
to duplicate collection infrastructure in the house-
hold sector across the whole of Austria.
The Commission granted an exemption from
June 20, 1994 to December 31, 2006, on condition
that BRGs in the ARA systemwould not hinder the
shared use of collection facilities. Further, that the
BRGs in the ARA system could only require dis-
posal firms to provide evidence of packaging quan-
tities corresponding to ARA’s share of the total
packaging licensed by recovery systems (the BRGs
contested these obligations as impractical and un-
reasonable).30 These obligations were considered
necessary to safeguard access to the disposal infra-
structure and, accordingly, competition on the mar-
ket for collection and recovery of packagingwaste.31
The exemption does not apply to ARA’s charges
system and any possible related cross-subsidising
issue. The focus is rather on the underlying ‘‘macro’’
structure of such waste collection systems. The
Commission also expressly noted that the decision
iswithoutprejudice to theapplicationofArt.82EC.
Air transport
In December 2003, the Commission cleared the
alliance between British Airways, Iberia and GB
Airways, a franchisee of British Airways.32 The
agreement, which was notified in July 2002 under
Regulation 3975/87 enables the parties to co-
operate in terms of pricing, scheduling and cap-
acity. It was cleared after certain Commission con-
cerns were met. Notably, the parties agreed to give
upenough slots to enable one competitor tooperate
four daily services between London Gatwick and
Madrid, and one further daily service between
London Gatwick and Bilbao. The parties also
undertook tosurrender sufficient slots foronedaily
service out of Gatwick to Seville and for another to
Valencia, if and when the number of business
passengers increases to a defined level.
In December 2003, the Commission also pub-
lished information on remedies proposed by Air
France and Alitalia for their bilateral alliance.33
Then, in April 2004, the Commission announced
a decision clearing the alliance agreement between
Air France and Alitalia.34
The two companies entered into a co-operation
agreement in 2001, with the aim of creating a
European ‘‘multi-hub system’’ based on their main
airports ofParisCharlesdeGaulle, RomeFiumicino,
and Milan Malpensa. The agreements involve,
amongst other things, agreements on prices and
the sharing of earnings on routes between France
and Italy (and general network co-operation on
pricing, scheduling and capacity). The companies
notified the agreement to the Commission in No-
vember 2001 for exemption.
Ingeneral, theCommissionwas favourable (as in
other recent alliance cases), recognising that con-
solidation is required in the European airline
sector, that the two airlines had mainly comple-
mentary networks, that the alliance agreement im-
proved connectivity, and that the co-operation
created cost savings and synergies for the parties.
However, as in other cases, the Commission has
structural concerns over overlapping route services.
Thus, theCommission identified seven routeswhere
the combination of Air France and Alitalia would
eliminate or significantly reduce competition (Paris-
Milan, Paris-Rome, Paris-Venice, Paris-Florence,
Paris-Bologna, Paris-Naples and Milan-Lyon) be-
cause,prior to thealliance, the twocompanieswere
the main competitors on these routes. After dis-
cussions, the two airlines agreed tomechanisms to
‘‘surrender’’ up to 42 pairs of slots per day, which
would allow some 21 return flights.
The ideawas that a new entrant would apply for
slots under the existing IATA slot allocation sys-
tem. If it cannotobtain them, thenanewentrant can
turn to the parties and seek slots, which the parties
agreed to make available up to certain limits, at
certain times and under conditions. The Commis-
sionwill also be involved in the process, notably in
assessing whether the new entrant is a sufficiently
viable long-term competitor. The parties also agreed
not to add new frequencies on a route where there
wasanewentrant for twoyears (save inexceptional
circumstances).
Otherwise, the parties agreed to enter into inter-
lining agreements with a new entrant, to ‘‘host’’ the
new entrant in their frequent flyer programmes if
required, and also agreed to enter into inter-modal
passenger agreements at the request of rail or other
surface or sea transport companies, towiden trans-
port choices.
In announcing its decision, the Commission
stated that, in practice, Air France and Alitalia
might not have to surrender as many slots as fore-
seen, because slots had become available through
the bankruptcies of airlines holding slots at Orly.
Companies such as Volare, Easyjet and Meridiana
were therefore offering services. However, the
Commission added that if any actual competitor
were to exit the market, Air France and Alitalia
wouldhave tomakeits slotsavailable toother rivals
inorder torestore the levelofcompetitionsoughtby
this decision.
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As with the Austrian Airlines/Lufthansa de-
cision, it appears therefore that the Commission is
taking the ongoing maintenance of competition
seriously in its remedies in this sector. The clear-
ance was granted for six years from November 12,
2001.
Credit card systems
In July 2004, the Commission sent a Statement of
Objections to nine major banks and to the French
Groupement des Cartes Bancaires ‘‘GCB’’.35 The
objections relate to an alleged agreement on bank
payment cards by means of which the banks, with
the help of Groupement des Cartes Bancaires, are
alleged tohavesharedout themarket for the issueof
CB cards in France in order to restrict competition
from new entrants, such as banking arms of large
retailers and medium-sized banks.
At the end of 2002, GCB, an economic interest
grouping under French law comprising some 155
banks, notified the Commission on behalf of its
members of the introduction of new, higher, com-
plex charges payable to GCB by banks issuing CB
cards.
The Commission appears to have formed the
view that the notified agreements stemmed from a
secret agreement to foreclose the market to new
entrants and stated that it found evidence thereof,
during inspections inMay 2003 on the premises of
GCB and of certain banks.
It is alleged that the tariffs adoptedbyGCBraised
newentrance charges for CB cards and forced them
to scale down their card-issuing projects consider-
ably. Interestingly, the Commission specifically
suggests that the agreement increased their costs
by up to e23 per card and per year, and that this
chargewas passed on to consumers.Moreover, it is
alleged that the banks party to the agreement were
spared the new charges, and benefited from them,
since the charges paid by new entrants accrued to
them.
This appears to be an interesting ‘‘Regulation 1/
2003 development’’ since, from May 1, 2004, pre-
sumablyGCB’snotificationexpiredandit therefore
no longer has immunity from fines. It will be inter-
esting to see whether the case develops further or
the banks adequately explain what was going on.
InAugust2004, theCommissionalsosentVISAa
Statement of Objections36 concerning a rule in the
Visa International by-laws according to which the
VISA InternationalBoard shall not accept formem-
bership any applicant deemed by the Board to be
a competitor of VISA. The Commission was con-
cerned that this rule has not been applied in an
objective and non-discriminatorymanner vis-a`-vis
all applicants for VISA membership. Notably, it
appears that in April 2000 Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter complained that it was denied VISA mem-
bership, apparently because it operates the ‘‘Dis-
cover’’ brand credit card, while others, such as
Citigroup (which owns Diners Club), some Japanese
banks (which are shareholders in the JCB system)
and Cetelem (which operates the Aurora payment
card network) are allowed. The Commission also
notes that Mastercard does not operate a similar
rule. There have been investigations on similar
issues before.37
According to the Commission’s preliminary
assessment, this VISA rule implies that potential
entrants would not be able to operate on the VISA
network anywhere in the EEA, restricting compe-
tition for merchant acquiring. In addition, being
refused VISA membership is thought to prevent
potential new entrants from engaging in cross-
border acquiring.38
Collective licensing of music copyrights
OnMay 3, 2004, the Commission sent a Statement
of Objections to 16 organisations which collect
royalties on behalf of music authors, stating that
their co-operation agreement (known as the ‘‘San-
tiago Agreement’’) was potentially contrary to the
EC competition rules.39
The Commission stated that the cross-licensing
arrangements which the collecting societies have
between themselves lead to an effective lock-up of
national territories, transposing into the internet
the national monopolies which the societies trad-
itionally have held otherwise. The SantiagoAgree-
mentwasnotified inApril 2001.Then, itwas stated
that thepurposeof the agreement is to alloweachof
the participating societies to grant to online com-
mercial users ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ copyright licences,
which include themusic repertoires of all societies
and which are valid in all their territories.
While supportive of that purpose, the Commis-
sion considered that the structure put in place by
the parties results in commercial users being lim-
ited in their choice to the monopolistic collecting
society established in their ownMemberState. The
Commission considered that the developments in
online activities should be accompanied by an
increasing freedom of choice by consumers and
commercial users throughout Europe as regards
their service providers. Notably, the Commission
considered that the territorial exclusivity afforded
by theSantiagoAgreement toeachof theparticipat-
ing societies was not justified by technical reasons
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and is irreconcilable with the worldwide reach of
the internet. It alsonoted that territorial exclusivity
was not required in the IFPI Simulcasting Agree-
mentwhich the Commission exempted in 2002.40
Thedateof thisStatement ofObjections suggests
that this is another ‘‘Regulation 1/2003 develop-
ment’’ since the societies’ notification has now
lapsed.41 Again, this is only a preliminary phase
andwewill have to seehow the societies justify the
territorial provisions in the circumstances.
Telenor Canal+
In January 2004, the Commission announced in a
short press release that it exempted for five years
certain exclusive distribution agreements between
Telenor and Canal+ Nordic, under which Telenor
will have the exclusive right to distribute Canal+
Nordic’s premium pay-TV channels in the Nordic
region through its satellite television platform
Canal Digital.42
The agreements were concluded in 2001, in
order to guarantee continuity of pay-TV service
after Telenor acquired the remaining 50 per cent
shareholding in Canal Digital from Canal+ Nordic.
Previously Canal Digital was a joint venture be-
tweenCanal+Nordic andTelenor. The agreements
as initially notified included a long-term exclu-
sivity, which the Commission considered anti-
competitive. The Commission stated that it de-
cided to exempt the co-operation after the parties
agreed to limit the exclusivity to a shorter period.
The Commission noted the presence of a second
satellite pay-TV distributor in the Nordic region,
MTG/Viasat, and thatconsumerswouldhaveavail-
able two distinct pay-TV brands at competitive
prices.
Distribution
Porsche
In May 2004, the Commission cleared Porsche’s
new distribution and after-sales network, after
Porsche committed to revise its agreements so as
to comply with the new Motor Vehicle Block
Exemption (‘‘MVBE’’).43 Porsche has opted for a
selective distribution system, as have almost all
the other car manufacturers.
As regards Porsche’s distribution network, deal-
ers are now free to provide after-sales services
directly, or to sub-contract them to an authorised
Porsche service centre.
The Commission found that the network is ‘‘de
minimis’’, as Porsche’s market shares in the rel-
evantmarkets for cardistributionarebelowfiveper
cent in each EUMember State. As a result, Porsche
is allowed to includecertain restrictive clauses listed
in Art.5 of the MVBE, as not appreciable in the
specific circumstances and outside Art.81(1) EC.44
In particular, Porsche is allowed to impose a ‘‘non-
compete’’ clause requiring dealers to sell compet-
ing car brands through separate showrooms and
sales personnel, as well as to prohibit dealers from
opening secondary outlets even beyond October 1,
2005 (when such ‘‘location clauses’’ generally will
not be capable of exemption under the MVBE).
As concerns its after-sales network, Porsche
could only opt for a qualitative selective system,
as it has more than 30 per cent of the Porsche car
repair market. Based on this system, the Porsche
official network is now open to any independent
repairers who fulfil the required qualitative criteria.
However, Porsche service centres are not al-
lowed to sell competing brands of sports cars and
sport utility vehicles, such as Aston Martin, Audi,
BMW, Jaguar, Lamborghini, LandRover,Mercedes
orVolkswagen (Touareg).TheCommission author-
isedthisnon-competeclause,as it foundthat itonly
affects some eight per cent of operators in the car
business and therefore theCommissionconsidered
that it was not an appreciable restriction on the
market for the repair of Porsche cars.Moreover, the
restriction did not apply to Porsche dealers who
may also have a repairworkshop or to independent
or authorised car repairers.
Poke´mon stickers and cards
InMay 2004, the Commission finedTopps, a group
of companies which produce Poke´mon stickers
and cards, somee1.6million for seeking to prevent
imports from low-price to high-price countries for
cards and sweets bearing the image of Poke´mon
cartoon characters.45
The Commission has found that Topps entered
into a series of agreements and/or concerted prac-
tices with several of its distributors in the United
Kingdom, Italy, Finland, Germany, France and
Spain with the objective of preventing parallel
imports. It appears that in 2000, Topps charged its
distributorsup to243percentmore inFinland than
in Portugal. The EEA market was estimated to be
worth e600 million in 2000. Distributors which
would not trace back parallel imports and monitor
[2005] I.C.C.L.R., ISSUE 3 c SWEET &MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]
116 RATLIFF: MAJOR EVENTSAND POLICY ISSUES IN EC COMPETITION LAW, 2003–2004 (PART 2): [2005] I.C.C.L.R.
40. O.J. L107/58, April 30, 2003 and [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 89.
41. In November 2003, the Commission also published
a notice inviting comments concerning the Cannes Ex-
tension Agreement on the administration of phono-
mechanical rights in Europe, O.J. C282/14, November 25,
2003.
42. IP/04/2, January 5, 2004, see also [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 61
and Nehl EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter,
Summer 2004 at p.56.
43. IP/04/585, May 3, 2004. With thanks to Flavia Dis-
tefano for her assistance.
44. See the Explanatory Brochure to the MVBE (‘‘Distri-
bution and Servicing of Motor Vehicles in the European
Union’’) of July 2002, Commission response toQuestion 7,
at p.23.
45. IP/04/682, May 26, 2004.
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art49
the final destination of the products were threat-
ened with supply cuts.
TheCommission states that it set the overall fine
at (only) some e1.6 million, taking into consider-
ation the short duration of the infringement and the
fact that itwas terminatedimmediatelyafter receipt
of a warning.
Repsol
In October 2004, the Commission published an
‘‘Art.27(4)’’ Notice in relation to Repsol’s motor
fuel distribution practices through service stations
situated in Spain.46 This is another ‘‘Regulation 1/
2003development’’, insofar as it is a notice indicat-
ing that, subject to market testing, the Commission
is planning to take a decision declaring commit-
ments binding under Art.9 of Regulation 1 and
inviting comments on such proposed action.
After notification of agreements andmodel con-
tractsbyRepsol inDecember2001, theCommission
found in March 2002 that Repsol’s distribution
practices involving non-compete clauses for the
party to the agreementwhichoperates at the lowest
level of thedistribution chain, could fallwithin the
scope of Regulation 17 and invited interested par-
ties to submit their possible observations.47 Then,
in June 2004, the Commission decided to initiate
proceedings with a view to adopting a decision
pursuant to Art.9 of Regulation 1/2003.
The notified agreements concern the exclusive
purchase of fuel by service station operators in
Spain and are of eight different categories depend-
ing on the type of tenure of the service station and
on the nature of the commercial relationship be-
tween Repsol and the service station operator.
Repsol was found to have market shares ranging
between 35 per cent and 50 per cent on the fuel
wholesale markets for petrol and diesel in Spain,
and similar shares on downstream market for re-
tailing of fuel in Spain.
TheCommission considered three issues: (a) the
distinction between agent and retailer in EC com-
petition law, (b) clauses relating to the setting of a
maximum fuel retail price, and (c) non-compete
clauses for fuel, which might foreclose the market.
As regards agency issues, the Commission does
not appear to have concluded whether the agents
are independent traders or not (in terms of taking
commercial or financial risk or not). However, the
Commission considered that, ‘‘whatever the agent’s
situation in the light of these criteria, the non-
compete clauses ... may be problematic owing to
the effects on inter-brand competition’’,48 notably,
if they lead to market foreclosure. As regards
maximum pricing, the Commission was not con-
cerned, since agents were free to grant discounts.
With regard to maximum prices, most of the
notified agreements prohibit service station oper-
ators from selling fuel at a price higher than the
maximum set by Repsol. On the other hand, oper-
ators are free to grant discounts. In some cases
Repsol simply recommended a retail price and
left it to the operators to set the actual price. Since
its investigation did not reveal any indications that
the setting ofmaximumpricesmight create signifi-
cant alignment effects, therewasnothing to suggest
a restriction of intra-brand competition.
As to the non-compete clauses, which only
cover fuel and not other products intended for
sale through service stations, the Commission
found that the agreements might facilitate signifi-
cantlyforeclosureonthe fuel retailmarket inSpain.
Non-compete clauses were found in more than
2,500 agreements, mainly for a duration of some
five years. Where Repsol owned the outlet, the
‘‘usufruct’’ or tenancy arrangement included non-
competes ranging from 25 to 40 years.
Due to significant vertical integration of oper-
ators, cumulative effects of the parallel networks of
vertical restraints, and difficulties arising because
of the saturation of themarket and the nature of the
product, the market was accessible only with diffi-
culty by competitors.49 In this context the Commis-
sion considered that the tied share of Repsol’s sales
was some 25–35 per cent, the non-compete obli-
gations were of substantial duration, and service
station operators and final customerswereweak in
comparison with suppliers such as Repsol which
had a substantial market share.50
Repsol proposed the following commitments, to
remain valid until May 31, 2010:
 To offer service station operators, with usu-
fruct or tenancy rights with only some 12
years left to run, the option to ‘‘buy back’’
the right in rem before the scheduled expiry
of their agreements.
 Toobserve a five-yearmaximumduration for
new fuel distribution agreements with oper-
ators where it is not the owner of the service
station concerned.
 Not to buy existing service stationswhich are
not already tied to its network outright from
their operators until the end of 2006.
 To advertise in advance the expiry of fuel
distributionagreementswithservicestations
and the option to terminate in advance agree-
ments involving rights in remviaacommuni-
cation to the Ministry of Economic Affairs
made public on the Ministry’s website.
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 A third-party (auditor) to draw up annual
reports for the Commission to verify com-
pliance by Repsol with the commitments.
The Commission has announced its intention to
adoptacommitmentdecisionaccepting theseunder-
takings, finding that Repsol’s commitments pro-
vide a ‘‘practical response to its concerns about
the foreclosure effects on the Spanish market’’.
TheCommissionconsidered that thecommitments
would increase the number of outlets open to
change supplier from 140–160 service stations per
year, to more than 400 per year. Agreement dur-
ations are also considerably shortened and a tem-
porary restraint on Repsol’s vertical integration is
introduced. The Commission considered that this
gives new opportunities for competitors to attain
the minimum number of outlets necessary for the
economic operation of a distribution system in the
sector.
It is an interesting development because there is
a lot behind this, above all a cumulative network
foreclosure assessment inacasewhere the supplier
has high market share (i.e. is above the Vertical
Restraints Block Exemption ceilings).
Articles 82–86 EC
Microsoft 51
In March 2004, the European Commission issued
its long awaitedMicrosoftdecision,whichhasnow
been published on its website.52 It is a mere 300
pages long!Thereisalreadyanenormousamountof
discussion and literature on the case.Microsoft has
already appealed. The case concerns two main
issues:
(1) Microsoft’s tying of the Windows operating
systemwith theWindowsMedia Player.
(2) Microsoft’s withholding of interoperability
specifications for server operating systems.
As regards Microsoft’s tying of Windows to Media
Player, since 1999 Microsoft has licensed its suc-
cessive versions of Windows operating systems
only in a bundle with its own Windows ‘‘Media
Player’’.53 TheCommission found this to constitute
illegal tying under Art.82(d) EC. In the Commis-
sion’s view, this practice amounts to an abuse of
Microsoft’s dominant position in the PC operating
systems market. The Commission ordered Micro-
soft to unbundle the two products bymaking avail-
able to PC OEM manufacturers a version of its
operating systems that does not include Media
Player code.54
The Commission concluded that Microsoft holds
a dominant position in the PC operating systems
market:
‘‘A dominant position which exhibits extraordinary
features since it controls the quasi-standard of the
relevant market in question and has done so for some
time. Microsoft’s dominance relies on high market
shares and significant barriers to entry’’.55
The Commission also found that ‘‘streaming’’
media players constitute a market separate from
PC operating systems. To support this finding,
the Commission relied, among other things, on
evidence of demand for streaming media players
separate from operating systems (mostly through
free internet downloads), aswell as the existence of
specialised media player vendors such as Real
Networks (RealPlayer) and Apple (QuickTime).
The Commission rejected Microsoft’s argument
that there is no consumer demand for operating
systems without a media player. It found that,
without Microsoft’s bundling, PC OEMs could
meet consumer demand for a pre-installed media
player by supplying the operating system with a
media player other than Media Player.
Then, the Commission found that Microsoft’s
refusal to license its Windows operating system to
OEMs without Media Player constituted tying
within the meaning of Art.82(d) EC. In particular,
the Commission observed that, although OEMs
were free to install additional media player soft-
ware, they were unable technically to un-install
WindowsMedia Player. It also rejectedMicrosoft’s
argument that Media Player is included in Win-
dows without ‘‘extra charge’’, because (i) a charge
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Table 3
— Microsoft
* e497 million fine for:
(i) bundling of Windows andMedia Player;
and
(ii) refusal to supply inoperability
specifications for server operating
systems.
* ‘‘Exceptional’’ grounds for disclosure even if
IP protected.
* Sophisticated 300-page decision (already
appealed).
— Coca-Cola
* Proposed commitments on exclusivity,
rebates, tying and some cooler access.
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for Media Player might be ‘‘hidden’’ in the Win-
dows/Media Player bundled price; and (ii) the
pricing issue was, in any event irrelevant to the
foreclosure concerns that drive the rules against
tying.
The Commission then undertook an extensive
analysis of the foreclosure effects of tying Media
Player toWindows. It foundthat, given theubiquity
of Microsoft’s operating system, suppliers of other
media players cannot gain comparable access to
customers’ PCs. Although the Commission exam-
ined other distribution channels (e.g. internet down-
loading and OEM installation agreements), it
concluded that none could match the penetration
of the Windows operating system.
The Commission also found the ubiquity of
Media Player to create incentives for content pro-
viders and software developers to encode their
products using only Media Player technology. Ac-
cording to the Commission, the rapid growth of
Media Player to the detriment of competing media
players (measured, e.g. on the basis of player usage,
formatusage, content offeredbywebsites, installed
base) shows the exclusionary effects of Microsoft’s
practice. Elsewhere in the decision, the Commis-
sion also noted the potential ‘‘chilling effect’’ of
Media Player-style bundling on software devel-
opers seeking to develop additional functionalities,
whose markets would be pre-empted if Microsoft
decided to integrate comparable functions into
Windows.56
Finally, the Commission considered, but ulti-
mately rejected, several ‘‘objective justifications’’
that Microsoft put forward. As to distribution ef-
ficiencies, the Commission noted that the same
efficiencies could be obtained if Microsoft offered
OEMs the choicewhether to include Media Player
or another media player with PCs they ship. As to
possible efficiencies resulting from content and
applications developers being able to place calls
to Media Player’s application programming inter-
faces (‘‘API’’), theCommission also found that such
efficiencies could be realised without tying, i.e.
by OEMs deciding on their own to pre-install
Media Player if the latter offers the best function-
ality.
As regardsMicrosoft’swithholding of interoper-
ability specifications, the Commission found that
Microsoft had infringed Art.82 EC by abusing its
dominance in the desktop and workgroup server
operating systemmarkets57 in order to achieve and
maintaindominance in the lattermarket. TheCom-
mission found thatMicrosoft had refused to supply
Sun Microsystems and other rivals with the speci-
fications for protocols that Windows workgroup
servers use.
By refusing to do so, Microsoft kept those com-
panies from implementing such specifications to
develop fully interoperable workgroup server op-
erating systemproducts.As a remedy, theCommis-
sion ordered Microsoft to provide all interested
parties with the necessary interoperability specifi-
cations within 120 days on reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms.58
The Commission foundMicrosoft dominant not
only in the market for PC operating systems, but
also in the market for workgroup server operating
systems, delivering file, print and group and user
administration services in small to medium-sized
networks.Microsoft vigorously argued that there is
not a separate market for such a narrow category of
server operating systems (Microsoft has a much
weaker market position for other types of server
operating systems, in particular for high-end ser-
vers). The company argued that the same operating
systems could be used for all types of servers,
regardless of what tasks the servers performed,
and that operating systems for higher-end types of
servers could easily be ‘‘slimmed down’’ to be sold
as workgroup server operating systems.
TheCommission responded thatMicrosoft itself
offers a differentiated range of server operating
systems for different tasks at significantly different
prices.Moreover, it found that due to their frequent
interaction with client PCs, workgroup server op-
erating systems require a higher degree of inter-
operability than operating systems for other types
of servers and are thus not substitutable by other
types of servers. This also led the Commission to
conclude that competitors could not easily ‘‘scale
down’’ operating systems originally designed for
higher-end servers, since those usually do not offer
the same degree of interoperability with client PCs
as workgroup servers do.
In the market for workgroup server operating
systems, the Commission estimated that Micro-
soft’smarket share exceeds60per cent. In addition,
it emphasised theclose linkswith themarket forPC
operating systems due to interoperability require-
ments. Referring in particular to the Tetra Pak II
judgment, it inferred from those links that Micro-
soft should be considered dominant in both mar-
kets. Nevertheless, it appears that the Commission
linksMicrosoft’s abusive behaviour primarily to its
dominance in themarket for PC operating systems.
The Commission found that Microsoft had
abused its dominant position by refusing to supply
specifications for both client-to-server and server-
to-server protocols that would enable competing
server operating systems software to fully operate
with theWindows domain architecture.59
The Commission reached this conclusion de-
spite its explicit recognition that disclosure of the
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relevant protocols could impinge on Microsoft’s
intellectual property rights. Although recognising
that refusals to license intellectual property can
constitute an abuse only in exceptional circum-
stances, the Commission refused to be bound by
an ‘‘exhaustive checklist’’ of such circumstances as
set out inMagill60 or other judgments by the Euro-
pean Court.
Here, the Commission found the following facts
to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying
the finding of an abuse.61
 First, Microsoft’s refusal to disclose protocol
specifications amounted to a disruption of
‘‘previous levels of supply’’. Inparticular, the
Commission found thatMicrosoftmade such
disclosures before it had a credible server
operating systems offering, but deliberately
discontinued them after it developed one, in
order to disadvantage its rivals.
 Secondly,Microsoft’s refusal todisclosepro-
tocol specifications risked eliminating com-
petition in the workgroup server operating
systems market, as demonstrated by Micro-
soft’s ‘‘rapid rise todominance’’ in thatmarket.
 Thirdly, the Commission emphasised that
interoperability disclosures were indispens-
able for rivals to compete, and that open
industry standards supported in Windows,
the distribution of client-side software by the
server operating systems vendor, or reverse
engineering of Microsoft’s products, pro-
vided no viable substitute.
 Fourthly, the Commission found that Micro-
soft’s conduct was not justified by the pro-
tectionof its intellectual property rights. ‘‘On
balance’’, any disincentives for future inno-
vation by Microsoft resulting from the com-
pulsory disclosure of such IP rightswould be
outweighed by the substantial promotion of
competitive innovation in the market as a
whole.62 The Commission repeatedly pointed
out that it was not requiring Microsoft to
disclose the actual source code of its operat-
ing systems, but only the specifications
necessary to ensure interoperability.
The Commission also fined Microsoft e497 mil-
lion, a huge sum in EC terms.
Clearstream
In June 2004, the Commission adopted a decision
against Clearstream International,63 having sent a
Statement of Objections in March 2003 alleging
abuse of dominance.64 In its decision, the Commis-
sion identified two typesof abuse: refusal to supply
and discriminatory pricing.
TheCommissionnoted that Clearstreamwas the
only ‘‘final custodian of German securities kept in
collective safe custody’’, and that Clearstream was
an unavoidable trading partner for intermediaries
seeking clearing and settlement services for the
registration of shares under German law.Newmar-
ket entry was unrealistic.
Consequently, by refusing Euroclear Bank SA
access to settlement services for German registered
shares for some two years, Clearstream had abused
its dominant position. The Commission also noted
that Euroclear could not duplicate the services that
itwas requesting, and that the refusal had the effect
of impairing Euroclear’s ability to provide an effi-
cient cross-border service in the downstream mar-
ket for cross-border clearing and settlement of EU
securities.
The Commission found discrimination because
of the unreasonable delay with which Clearstream
eventually supplied Euroclear (two years) in com-
parisonwith other customers (fourmonths).More-
over, bychargingEuroclear ahigherper transaction
price than other securities depositories outside
Germany in the years between 1997 and 2001,
Clearstream had also discriminated in its prices to
Euroclear.
By the time the Commission adopted its deci-
sion, the infringements had ceased. No fine was
imposed, because accountwas takenof the fact that
there was no EC case law dealing with the relevant
issues, and because clearing and settlement ser-
vices in theEUareevolving, inparticular as regards
cross-border transactions.65
Interbrew
Following last year’s settlement with regard to
Interbrew’s ‘‘tied house’’ purchasing system on
the retail level in Belgium,66 in April 2004, the
Commission closed a procedure concerning Inter-
brew’s rebate practices in relation to Belgian beer
wholesalers, after it had received a series of com-
mitments.67 The Commission specifically stated
that Interbrew’s amended commercial practices
do not constitute an abuse of Interbrew’s alleged
dominant position on the Belgian beer market.
As regards its rebate system, Interbrew offers
standardised volume rebates based on the total
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volume of each type of beer purchased by a whole-
saler in ayear, paying the rebate for eachcategoryof
beer. Rebates will be more transparent in the sense
that wholesalers will know the full rebate scale.
Wholesalers which sell Interbrew’s beer through
their own tied retail outlets also receive separate
rebates for each type of beer sold. However, these
will no longer increase as a function of the number
of the wholesalers’ tied outlets. Instead, they are
paid for fixed amounts of particular beers sold,
irrespective of the number of outlets.
Interbrew also has some ‘‘management support’’
partnership agreements with wholesalers. Inter-
brew will no longer have the pre-emption right to
buy the wholesaler’s business in the event of a
competitor’s bid. Moreover, it will no longer have
access to the wholesaler’s confidential business
data.
Interbrew also has commercial agreements with
wholesalers, according to which Interbrew grants
them incentives in return for promotional activi-
ties. In these agreements, Interbrew will abolish
product exclusivity requirements, make the eligi-
bility criteria fully transparent and clarify that the
same incentives are open to all wholesalers.
Finally, Interbrew has terminated its distri-
bution agreement with its competitor Haacht, ac-
cording to which Interbrew beers have benefited
from exclusive access to retail outlets tied to
Haacht.
Interbrew agreed to introduce these changes by
December 31, 2004.
Proposed Coca–Cola Settlement
In September 2004, after a five-year investigation,
the Commission decided to initiate proceedings
with a view to adopting a commitment decision
pursuant toArt.9ofRegulation1/2003inrelation to
Coca-Cola’s commercial practices in the EU. The
commitments from Coca-Cola were received in
October and are published on the Commission’s
website for third-party comments.68
These commitments establish rules which will
govern the practices of The Coca-Cola Company
and its bottlers, and are applicable to all sales of all
carbonated soft drinks under the Coca-Cola brand
destined for consumption incountrieswhereCoca-
Cola or its bottlers may be subject to Art.82 EC or
Art.54 of the EEA agreement. They concern the
take-home and on-premise channels, sponsorship
and public and private tender agreements and
technical equipment placement.
Themaincommitmentsproposedare as follows:
 Coca-Cola customers will remain free to buy
and sell any third-party carbonated soft
drinks and will not be required to purchase
aspecifiedminimumpercentageof their total
requirements.
 Coca-cola will offer no target or growth re-
bates and no tying provisions linking Coca-
Colabrandedcolaororange tootherproducts
in its range.
 Where Coca-Cola agreements include shelf
space commitments, these will be non-
exclusive and defined separately for Cola
and orange carbonated soft drinks.
 Where Coca-Cola sponsors venues, it will
not require that non-Coca-Cola branded soft
drinks will not be available in the venue,
other thaninrespectof thesponsoringbrands
or flavour categories.
 Where Coca-Cola sponsors limited duration
events, exclusive supply rights for the full
range of Coca-Cola’s soft drinks may be
linked to the sponsorship agreement, pro-
vided that the event does not exceed 60
days per year.
 However, Coca-Cola may compete for and
enter into public tender agreements contain-
ing exclusive beverage supply rights.
 The same applies for private tender agree-
ments, provided that they are limited to a
maximumof five years and give the customer
an annual option to terminate the agreement
without penalty after an initial term not ex-
ceeding three years.
There are particular provisions as regards ‘‘cool-
ers’’/vending machines:
 Where Coca-Cola provides a beverage cooler
ona rent-free basis and the customerdoesnot
have any other installed chilled beverage
capacity to which the consumer has direct
access, thecustomerwill be free touseat least
20 per cent of that cooler’s capacity for any
products of its choosing.
 Where the cooler is being provided in ex-
change for rental payments, the customer
will also be free to stock any products of its
choosing in at least 20 per cent of the cooler’s
capacity.
 If thecustomerhaspurchased thecooler from
Coca-Cola or a manufacturer to which Coca-
Cola refers the customer, it will be free to
stock the cooler with any products of its
choosing.
 Furthermore, Coca-Colawill not require cus-
tomers to refrain from placing competing
fountain dispensers or packaged carbonated
soft drinks on any premises, while purchase
commitments for products sold through
fountain dispensers will not exceed three
years and customers will have the option to
terminate such commitments without pen-
alty with effect at any time following an
initial term not exceeding three years.
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 No agreement under which Coca-Cola pro-
vides vendingmachineswill require that the
customer refrains from placing competing
vending machines on any premises.
This is almost an anti-climactic proposed settle-
ment, since many had expected a major fight. We
will have to see what the final decision looks like.
However, thus far, it is interesting to see that the
Commission appears to be requiring unbundling
within a product family. If so, that is a new devel-
opment. Equally, dominant companies may be
encouraged to see the Commission allowing exclu-
sivity for specific contexts, such as sponsorship
and in the context of tenders.
The ‘‘Coca-Cola companies’’ concerned propose
to apply the commitments throughout the EU,
Norway and Iceland insofar as Coca-Cola branded
carbonated soft drinks (‘‘CSD’’) accounted, in the
year, formore than 40per cent andmore than twice
the share of the nearest competitor of national CSD
sales in either the take-home or on-premises sales
channel.
Telecoms issues
In December 2003, the Commission issued a State-
ment of Objections to Telia Sonera (‘‘TS’’) alleging
that TS had abused its dominant position in the
markets for the provision of local broadband infra-
structure and the provision of high-speed internet
access, by intentionally bidding below cost for the
construction and operation of such a network for
HSB Malmo¨, a regional housing association.69 It
appears that in October 1999, Telia, which was
not yet merged with Sonera and owned approxi-
mately 90 per cent of the local infrastructure sus-
ceptible to be used for the provision of high-speed
internet access, won a bid for a contract with HSB
Malmo¨, the second largest co-operative housing
association in Sweden, to construct a new fibre-
optic network and provide broadband services to
households in the Malmo¨ region exclusively for
five years. A competitor, B2 Bredband AB, com-
plained.
In March 2004, the Commission terminated its
investigation of alleged abusive margin squeezing
by Deutsche Telekom (‘‘DT’’) in the provision of
broadband access to its fixed telecommunications
network.70 DT was considered to be the dominant
supplier of broadbandaccessbothatwholesale and
at retail level, and the only operatorwith a network
of nationwide coverage. DT also accounted for al-
most 90per cent of the retailmarket.Competitors of
DT alleged that its tariffs for line-sharing were so
high that they could not make any profits from
offering the broadband service at retail level. There
was only a tight margin between the line-sharing
tariff of DT and the end consumer price for broad-
band service via ADSL, which prevented entry to
themarket by new competitors. Line sharing tariffs
were introducedby theGermanRegulator inMarch
2002 and it is on that date that DT’s practice alleg-
edly started.
The Commission decided to accept commit-
ments proposed by DT in this case and not to
open formal proceedings. DT committed to stop
charging its competitorsmonthly line sharing from
April2004until theendof2004andtosubstantially
reduce the current line sharing tariffs from the
beginning of 2005. Additionally, DT decided to
increase certain of its retail ADSL tariffs.
Germanmail rules
In October 2004, the Commission addressed a de-
cision pursuant to Arts 86(3) and 82 EC against
Germany concerning its legal postal regulatory
framework.71 According to certain provisions
thereof, private senders are allowed to feed self-
preparedmail directly into Deutsche Post’s sorting
centres and are granted discounts for doing so,
while commercial mail preparation firms are not
given such discounts.
The Commission considered that the respective
provisions induced Deutsche Post, which has the
exclusive rights to distribute letters below 100
grams, to discriminate against commercial sorting
operators, placing them at a considerable competi-
tive disadvantage. Germanywas given twomonths
to inform the Commission of themeasures taken to
comply with EC competition law.
Current policy issues
Legal privilege
There are some interesting signs of possible elab-
oration of legal privilege. Perhaps not a revolution,
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Table 4
— Legal Privilege
* Akzo Nobel:
 Privilege for preparatory material before
approaching counsel
 And for in-house lawyers, members of a
Bar?
— Private actions for damages
* A Green Paper to come; debate launched
— Art.82 EC Guidelines
* Clear work going on:
 How to modernise classic European
Court case-law?
 With a rebuttable presumption for some
effect cases, involving efficiencies?
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but some extension of the scope of the privilege,
resulting from recent court proceedings involving
Akzo Nobel.
In February 2003, the Commission issued a de-
cision orderingAkzoNobel,AkcrosChemicals and
their subsidiaries to submit to an investigation
under Art.14(3) of Regulation 17. The Commission
carried out an onsite inspection at the companies’
premises, during which a dispute arose between
the Commission officials and company represent-
atives with respect to five documents which the
company claimed to be covered by professional
privilege.
Copies of two of these documents, allegedly
drafted for the purpose of a telephone conversation
with an outside counsel, were placed in a sealed
envelope. The remaining three documents were
simply copied and not treated in any special way.
These contained a series of handwritten notes by
the General Manager of Akcros Chemicals, drafted
during discussions with lower level employees for
the purpose of preparing the sealed documents, as
well as an exchange of emails between the General
Manager of Akcros Chemicals and Akzo Nobel’s
competition lawcoordinator,whowas amemberof
the Dutch Bar and also a member of Akzo Nobel’s
legal department employed by Akzo on a perman-
ent basis.
Through applications for interim measures, the
question of the possible privilege applying to these
various documents came before the President of
the CFI, who made a number of interesting obser-
vations.71a
First, as regards the ‘‘sealed documents’’, the
President considered that there might be a need to
extend the scope of professional privilege, as de-
fined by the case law, inorder to cover alsoworking
or summarydocumentsdrafted for thesolepurpose
of obtaining the assistance of a lawyer.72 Interest-
ingly thatmight include the reviewof facts connec-
ted with a current investigation or an investigation
which a company might reasonably fear or antici-
pate, andwhere therefore the companymight choose
to prepare in defence in advance.73 As regards the
handwrittennotes, thePresident took a similar view.
Secondly, as regards the email exchangewith an
in-house counsel admitted to the Dutch Bar, the
judge first noted that the emails were not, in prin-
ciple, coveredbyprofessional privilege onAM&S.73a
However, the President stated that such a rule
might need review since AM&S, especially where
in-house counsel were members of a Bar.74
Thirdly, the President also underlined that legal
privilege is not just about rights of the defence, it is
about the right of every person to consult a lawyer
without constraint.75 This is something which
seems to have been forgotten in recent years where
regulators sometimes see privilege as an abusive
tactic to avoiddetectionof competition law infringe-
ments, rather than a fundamental value and right.
Many are nowwatching with great interest how
the Court will interpret legal privilege in the main
proceedings, conscious that an internal summary
of external legal advice is already privileged and
that not to allow a company to prepare material for
the purpose of consulting external counsel may be
both counter-productive in undermining genuine
compliancestepsandatoddswith the fundamental
right justnoted. (ThePresident’s actual ruling turns
on the interim nature of his review and the specific
balance of interest in the circumstances and has
been appealed to the ECJ since.)
Private actions for damages
The Commission is now pushing to promote more
private actions to enforce the competition rules,76
although conscious that there have been few dam-
ages awards. In practice, such actions are still very
difficult (although there have been some settle-
ments).TheCommissionhassoughta (major) study
on the conditions for claims for damages, prepared
by Ashurst, which has now been published on DG
COMP’swebsite.There is also auseful article in the
Commission’s Newsletter summarising the related
issues and some of the existing damages awards,
notably in France and Sweden.77 The Commission
states that it envisages a Green Paper to identify
potential ways forward.
Article 82 EC Guidelines
The Commission is also thinking seriously about
modernisation of Art.82 EC enforcement. At the
time of writing, it appears that the Commission
does not plan any discussion draft until themiddle
of 2005 at the earliest.
In October 2004, Mr Monti emphasised that, in
thisarea, theEUpositionmaybedrivenbydifferent
interpretations and considerations to those in the
United States.
Substantively, there is much discussion about
whether and if so, how to allow the dominant to
compete more, based on efficiency arguments.78
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There is also debate about the extent to which
competitors of the dominant should have equal
opportunities to compete and develop the critical
mass to survive in the market.
There is debate about whether per se rules are
appropriate, although, as noted in the first part of
this paper, at least in the case of loyalty rebates, the
European Court appears to consider such an ap-
proach valid, given the market strength of the
dominant.Against this, part of thewhole ‘‘modern-
ising’’ process has been to focus on effects. If effects
arenotunreasonable ineconomicterms,shouldnot
a dominant company be allowed to pursue its often
self-created, rather than incumbent successful busi-
ness? Predictability is also considered key, so that
companies can comply reasonably easily on the
basis of practical tests.
It also appears that the Commission is willing to
allow dominant companies greater use of Art.81(3)
EC.
Areas of specific interest
Liberal professions
Belgian architects fee system
In June 2004, the Commission fined the Belgian
Architects Association e100,000, concluding that
its scale of recommended minimum fees was a
violation of the EC competition rules.79
The recommended prices were considered to
facilitate price co-ordination. In the Commission’s
view, such fees should reflect an architect’s skills,
efficiency, costs and perhaps reputation and should
not bedependent solelyon thevalueof theworksor
the price of the entrepreneur. In any event, the
architect should determine the fee independently
ofcompetitorsandinagreementwiththeclientalone.
The amount of the fine was stated to reflect a
gradual approachby theCommission in fininganti-
competitive practices in the professions and also
the fact that the feescalewasabolished in2003.The
Commission also noted that the French Compe-
tition Council prohibited the French Architects’
Association from further elaborating and distribut-
ing fee scales in 1997, while the UK Office of Fair
Trading also came to the conclusion that the Royal
InstituteofBritishArchitects’ (RIBA) indicative fee
guidance could facilitate collusion.
Commission ‘‘Communication’’
In February 2004, the Commission issued a ‘‘Com-
munication on Competition in Professional Ser-
vices’’.80 This is a follow-up to the detailed ‘‘Vienna
Study’’ commissioned and published last year, as
well as the related Commission conference.
The Communication is a clear piece of compe-
tition advocacy, as the Commission invites profes-
sional associations to review the proportionality
of any restrictive practices into which they have
entered, with the threat of NCA or European Com-
mission intervention against unjustified practices,
whether directly against the professions concerned,
or indirectly by ‘‘disallowing’’ or otherwise chal-
lenging laws contrary to Arts 10 and 81 EC.81
Clearly the Commission may have a point con-
cerning some of the more blatant, often old prac-
tices.However, inmanyareas thiswill be a farmore
complexdebate than theCommunication suggests.
On Wouters, it is clear that restrictions may be
justified and outside Art.81(1) EC in specific cir-
cumstances, if essential to preserve core values of a
profession. It is also perfectly valid on Arduino to
proposesuggested restrictions topublicauthorities
which, after appropriate review, may choose to
adopt them as their own regulations.
On the other hand, in some circumstances, state
action may be challenged as merely ‘‘facilitating’’
an anti-competitive agreementwhich is contrary to
Art.81(1) EC and patently disproportionate private
restrictions clearly may fall within Art.81(1) EC.
National competition authorities also have a duty
to disallow such laws on Italian Matches.
However, judging the proportionality of a state
measure can be difficult, especiallywhere the state
overtlywishes to further specificuniversal (public)
service or quality value considerations.82
It is a little disconcerting to see the Commission
arguing (as occurred after the detailed study last
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Table 5
— Liberal Professions
* Belgian architects fine.
 Recommendedminimum fee system.
* Competition Advocacy/Communication.
 Serious drive on blatantly unjustified or
disproportionate restrictions.
 Others may involve more difficult
balancing.
— Energy
* Amarathon ‘‘Marathon’’ (where the runner
dropped out long ago?!)
 Entry/exit fee systems andmultiple zone
charges.
* Decisions on territorial restrictions
announced.
— Sport/Media
* Packaging of football media rights and a
decision at last!
* Hollywood Studios MFN clauses withdrawn
(mainly).
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year) that just because some Member States take a
very ‘‘liberal’’ approach with one notion of service,
others with more restrictive systems supporting a
differentnotionof servicearenecessarily following
disproportionate solutions.
Onemayalso think that there is amiddlepath, in
which key professional values associated with lib-
eral professions can be reasonably balanced with
competition.However, at themoment theCommis-
sion’s advocacy is clearly aimed to push fast for
change, at least as regards those restrictions which
are not reasonable in this sense.
Energy
More ‘‘Marathon’’ settlements
In April 2004, the French and the German gas
companies, Gaz de France and Ruhrgas, offered
commitments to improve third-partyaccess to their
respective networks, thereby settling the Commis-
sion’s investigation into their alleged refusal to
grant the Norwegian subsidiary of the US gas pro-
ducer, Marathon, access to their networks.83
It may be recalled that in April and July 2003
theCommission announced that it had settledwith
Gasunie and BEB, having previously settled the
case with Thyssengas in November 2001.84
The commitments by Gaz de France and Ruhr-
gas, which reflect the market situation in each
country andare thereforenot identical,will remain
in force for several years. Their fulfilment will be
monitored by a trustee who is to report to DG
Competition.
The main commitments made by Gaz de France
are:
 Gradual reduction in the number of tariff
and balancing zones on which the entry/
exit transport system is based in France.
The idea is to reduce the number of zones
from seven to two by 2009, facilitating access
for new entrants by reducing the cost of
transport connectedwith the crossing of sev-
eral zones.
 Starting in January 2005, the transport div-
ision of Gaz de France will offer operators
the possibility to convert high calorific value
gas into low calorific value gas, thus giving
greater access to gas which can be used to
compete for low calorific gas users (a large
part of the French market).
 Starting in January 2005, for three years, Gaz
de France has undertaken to implement a
‘‘gas release programme’’ in southern France,
where there is currently no competition.
The main commitments by Ruhrgas are:
 There will be a new regime allowing cus-
tomers to book gas transport capacities sep-
arately at entry and exit points, without
bookinganycapacitybetweenthetwopoints.
 Ruhrgaswill introduce six tariff zones, which
it will progressively reduce to four by May
2006.
 Ruhrgas will extend the new entry/exit re-
gime beyond its own network, to include
other regional transmission companies in
which it holds a majority or minority stake.
In addition to these commitments, Gaz de France
and Ruhrgas will improve transparency, handling
of requests for network access and congestionman-
agement. Ruhrgas also promised to introduce the
so-called ‘‘use-it-or-lose-it’’ principle into all its
transport contracts.
Territorial restrictions
In October 2004, the Commission announced that
it had taken two decisions concerning territorial
restrictions in the gas sector.85 They concern two
contracts concluded by Gaz de France in 1997, one
with ENI, and the other with ENEL.
Under a transport contract between GdF and
ENI, GdF transports gas bought by ENI in northern
Europe through French territory to the border with
Switzerland. This contract contained a clause ob-
liging ENI to market the gas only after leaving
France (‘‘downstream of the redelivery point’’).
The contract between GdF and ENEL concerned
swaps of gas purchased by ENEL in Nigeria and
required ENEL to use the gas only in Italy. The
Commission considered that these clauses parti-
tioned national markets by preventing French con-
sumers from being supplied by ENI and ENEL.
The Commission adopted the two decisions,
although the parties had already terminated the
infringements, with a view to clarifying the situ-
ation for all undertakings operating in the gas
sector.
Sport and media
UEFA Champions League
In November 2003, the Commission published its
(long awaited) decision in the UEFA Champion-
ships League case.86
Itmayberecalled that theCommissionconsiders
the collective, exclusive sale by UEFA on behalf
of national clubs or football associations of the
broadcasting rights to the final stages of the UEFA
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Champions League to be a price-fixing agreement
and an output restriction which limits the broad-
casting of football.87 Such awards are also con-
sidered to distort competition in broadcasting
markets for which football is key content.
In August 2002, however, the Commission pub-
lished an Art.9(3) Notice, proposing to take a
favourablepositiononUEFA’s revisedcommercial
policy under which UEFA would award the tele-
vision rights following a public invitation to bid to
broadcasters for various packages ofmedia rights.88
In its decision, the Commission distinguished
the following relevant markets:
 The upstreammarkets for the sale and acqui-
sition of free-TV, pay-TV and pay-per-view
rights;
 thedownstreammarkets onwhich television
broadcasters compete for advertising rev-
enue depending on audience rates, and for
pay-TV/pay-per-view subscribers;
 the markets for media rights for new media
(wireless/3G/UMTS rights, internet rights
and video-on-demand rights); and
 the markets for other commercial rights,
namely sponsorship, ‘‘suppliership’’ and
licensing.
As regards notably the upstream markets for tele-
vision and pay-per-view rights, the Commission
considered several factors in relation to the special
value of broadcasting rights for football events,
which can be attributed to this sport’s ability to
act as a developer of a brand image of channels and
to attract the most sought-after viewers (i.e. men
withanaboveaverage spendingpower andwhoare
in the age groups of 16–20 and 35–40).
The Commission then concluded that there ex-
isted a separate market for the acquisition of tele-
vision broadcasting rights to football which is
played regularly throughout everyyear.89Thisdefi-
nition involvedmatches innational leagueandcup
events, aswell as theUEFAChampionsLeague and
UEFA Cup.
Interestingly the Commission concluded that:
‘‘... therearenoprogrammeswhichplaceacompetitive
constraintontheabilityof theholderof theTVrights to
football events being played regularly throughout
every year to determine the price of these TV rights.
TV rights to other sports events or other types of
programmes such as feature films do not put a com-
petitive restraint on the holder of the TV rights to such
football events. Including such rights in the market
definition would make the definition too wide. In
other words, there is no substitutability between the
TV rights to football and the TV rights to other pro-
grammes.’’90 (Emphasis added).
The Commission found that the grant by football
clubs to UEFA of the exclusive right to sell jointly
certain commercial rights on behalf of the clubs fell
within Art.81(1) EC, as did the restrictions on the
football clubs selling their commercial rights indi-
vidually. The Commission noted, however, that
UEFA might be the co-owner of some of the media
rights as a result of its role in organising the League
and UEFA ‘‘brand image’’ (without purporting to
ruleon the issue).TheCommission thenconcluded
that an Art.81(3) EC exemption was justified.
Through the joint sellingarrangements, aquality
branded content product sold in packages via a
single point of sale was created, thus providing
advantages for media operators, football clubs and
viewers. Media operators and consumers could
receivemore efficient and easier access to a unique
contentwhich, in addition,was carrying theUEFA
Champions League brand label.
The joint arrangement not only created effi-
ciencies for media operators, which would be able
to invest in improvedproduction and transmission
technologies, but also allowed viewers to obtain
access to better quality media coverage, enabling
themtowatchallpremiummatchesover thecourse
of the entire season.
The Commission also accepted that the restric-
tionswere indispensable toprovidetheefficiencies
and improvements leading to consumers benefits,
as long as the joint selling body was able to find
demand for the jointly sold media rights.91
Finally, the Commission accepted that the ar-
rangements did not eliminate competition. The
Commission found that (i) UEFA Champions Lea-
gue rights represented only some 20 per cent of the
relevant market; (ii) the jointly sold media rights
had been split up into packages offered for sale in a
competitive bidding procedure open to all inter-
estedmedia operators; and (iii) bothUEFA and the
football clubs sold certain categories of these rights
on a non-exclusive basis.
However, the Commission found that no ben-
efits arose from the restriction on football clubs
selling live televisionrights to free-TVbroadcasters
and subjected its decision to the condition that
football clubs be able to do so where there was no
reasonable offer from any pay-TV broadcaster. The
duration of the exemption was set for two contract
periods with expiry on July 31, 2009.
English FA Premier League
In December 2003, the Commission also an-
nounced that it had reached a ‘‘provisional agree-
ment’’ with the English FA Premier League
concerning the joint selling of media rights to
Premier League matches.92
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The League has agreed that after 2006 there
would be at least two television broadcasters of
live League matches. The League would create
‘‘balanced packages’’ of matches ‘‘showcasing’’ the
Premier League as a whole, and no broadcaster
would be allowed to buy all of the packages. The
auctions will be examined by the Commission and
Premier League to ensure that they do not exclude
potential competitors.
BSkyB, which recently acquired the television
rights toPremierLeaguematches,hasalsoagreed to
offer to sub-license a set of up to eight top quality
Premier League matches each season to another
broadcaster (starting next season).
German Bundesliga
In September 2004, the Commission published an
Art.27(4) Notice in relation to the joint selling of
media rights to the German Bundesliga.93 This is
anotherRegulation1/2003development, insofar as
it is a notice indicating that, subject to market
testing, the Commission is planning to take an
Art.9 decision declaring commitments binding,
and inviting comments on such proposed action.
The commitments are summarised in the Official
Journal, but the actual terms are published on the
Commission’swebsite. Substantively, the commit-
ments fit the same sort of standard pattern as the
UEFA case.
The Commission is concerned that if all the
media rights to the first andsecondGerman football
leagues are sold through a central marketing sys-
tem, then clubs lose the right to sell their rights in
packages andatpricesof their ownchoosing.More-
over, there is concern that obtaining the rights can
have crucial significance to downstream advertis-
ing and pay-per-view markets, for which such
content may be important.
As a result, the clubs are authorised to transfer
media rights to the Bundesliga, but these are then
offered to ‘‘exploiters’’ in 10 packages, according to
content and transmission medium (e.g. live, ‘‘near
live’’ and deferred transmission of matches, high-
lights etc. for free-to-air television, pay-per-view,
internet and mobile phones, etc.). Rights packages
are for amaximumof three seasons andclubs retain
rights to sell home games to free-to-air television
broadcasters and home and away game extracts on
the internet.Unusedrightsmayalsobeexploitedby
the clubs. The Commission has reserved its pos-
ition should one company acquire several centrally-
marketed packages with exclusive rights.
Finally,we shouldnote that in January 2004, the
Commission announced a sectoral investigation in
thesaleof sports rights to internetcompaniesandto
providers of third generation mobile phone ser-
vices, with a view to acquiring comprehensive
information on the availability of audiovisual
sports rights in theEuropeanUnionandonpossible
relevant anti-competitive practices that need to be
addressed.94
Hollywood film studios
In October 2004, the Commission closed its inves-
tigation into the so-called ‘‘output deals’’ between
six major Hollywood film studios and a number
of pay-television companies in the EU.95 Output
deals, which are common in the Hollywood film
industry, are agreementswhereby the studios agree
to sell to broadcasters their entire film productions
for a given period of years.
The Commission objected to so-called ‘‘most
favoured nation’’ clauses which gave the studios
the right to enjoy the most favourable terms agreed
between a pay-TV company and any one of them,
because theCommissionconsideredthat thecumu-
lative effect of these clauses distorted price compe-
tition. Inparticular, any increaseagreedwithoneof
these studios would trigger the right to parallel
increases for the prices of other studios.
Six studios have either withdrawn the clause or
waived their related rights. Two studios, NBCUni-
versal andParamount,havenot agreed towithdraw
the clause from their respective contracts.
International
EU-related issues in US courts
Two cases decided in the United States Supreme
Court in June 2004 deserve comment for their
European interest.96
First, in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagran
SA, the Supreme Court set aside a lower court
ruling under which purchasers that had bought a
cartelised product outside the United States from
non-US sellers could nonetheless sue for treble
damages in the US courts, if the conspiracy had
some effect in the United States. The issue hinged
on the interpretation of theUS Foreign Trade Anti-
trust Improvements Act of 1982, a statute that was
meant toclarify theextent towhich theUSantitrust
laws apply to foreign conduct.
The Supreme Court’s ruling cut back on the
scopeof recovery forpurchasers outside theUnited
States,butdidnotwhollyclose the issue.TheCourt
said that foreign purchasers could not sue in the
United States when their injury from the cartel is
‘‘independent’’ of the cartel’s effect in the United
States. As might be expected, the question as to
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when foreign andUS injuries are ‘‘independent’’ of
one another is now being litigated in the US cases.
Secondly, in Intel Corp v Advanced Micro De-
vices Inc, the Supreme Court held that US legis-
lation aimed at securing US-located evidence to
assist foreign tribunals, 28 USC s.1782, could be
used by a complainant in a non-US antitrust inves-
tigation to obtain discovery from the company
against which it was complaining. AMD, a US-
based semiconductor maker, had complained to
the European Commission about conduct by its
rival, Intel, that AMD argued constituted an abuse
of adominant position by Intel.AMDhadasked the
Commission to require Intel to provide the Com-
missionwithdocumentswhich Intelhadproduced
in US intellectual property litigation with another
company, but the Commission declined to do so.
AMD then brought an action in a US Federal Court
seeking the Intel documents so that AMD could
give them to the Commission.
The Commission filed an amicus brief arguing
that US discovery should not be available to com-
plainants in Commission investigations. It argued
that it was not a ‘‘tribunal’’ within the meaning of
theUS legislation and that allowing suchdiscovery
would interfere with its own proceedings. The
Court nonetheless held that the statute allows dis-
covery in such cases, but noted that it leaves the
District Court with substantial discretion as to
whether or on what terms to allow discovery. The
case was remanded to the District Court, which
then declined to grant AMD’s discovery request
on the grounds, inter alia, that the Commission
had made clear that it did not want the material
and did not welcome the US court’s ‘‘assistance’’.
EU-China and Korea competition dialogues
InMay 2004,MrMonti and the Chinese Commerce
Minister signed an agreement on a ‘‘structured
dialogue’’ on competition between the European
UnionandChina.97Thisagreement isa follow-upto
adeclarationsigned inNovember2003between the
Commissioner and the ministerial authorities that
are responsible for the drafting of the new Chinese
competition law.98
The agreement constitutes the basis for a formal
dialogue having as its primary objective a ‘‘perma-
nent forum of consultation and transparency’’ be-
tween China and the EU in this area.
In October 2004, Mr Monti and the Chairman of
the Korean Fair Trade Commission appear to have
signed a similar Memorandum of Understanding
on a similar ‘‘structured dialogue’’ on competition
between the EU and Korea.99 ThisMemorandum is
perceivedas thebasis fora formaldialoguebetween
the EU and the Republic of Korea which makes
official the existing co-operation practices.
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